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UNDUE PROCESS: CONGRESSIONAL
REFERRAL AND JUDICIAL RESISTANCE
IN THE SCHIAVO CONTROVERSY
Adam M. Samaha*
The congressional response to the Schiavo controversy was
both extraordinary and feeble. It surely was exceptional in its
speed and specificity. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of
Theresa Marie Schiavo1 was introduced and approved within a
weekend-just days after the feeding tube was removed from
Schiavo's body, and only a month after her husband obtained a
state court order for that purpose.' The legislation, moreover,
could not have been more targeted. The statute's content followed its title, granting certain litigation privileges to the parents
and Schiavo alone. Congress had legislated in a one-case-only
fashion before, of course? But private bills tend to resolve controversies. The Schiavo Act, even on its broadest conceivable
reading, could do nothing to settle the dispute it addressed. It
was meant to unsettle the situation, which the federal courts
promptly refused to do.
This kind of congressional action-dealing with a single private dispute and disrupting prior judicial conclusions without
implementing new substantive law-is unlikely to recur with any
frequency. The Act was more high drama than emerging model.
And it is surprisingly difficult to tell whether the federal courts
legitimately avoided a more thorough evaluation of the parents'
claims. The constitutionality of the Act is open to good-faith dis*

Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Douglas Baird,

Emily Buss, Dan Farber, Saul Levmore, Cara Robertson, Lior Strahilevitz, David
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1. Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
2. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003, 2005 WL 459634, at *2
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 25, 2005). A similar order issued five years earlier and was affirmed,
see In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), but fur-

ther litigation and legislation kept Schiavo alive, see Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 32628 (Fla. 2004).
3. See infra note 28 (discussing private bills).

HeinOnline -- 22 Const. Comment. 505 2005

506

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 22:505

agreement.4 So it could be that the decision costs associated with
analyzing the constitutional question at this late date are not
worth the value of knowing the right answer.
This concern about decision costs is linked to a much larger
problem, however-a problem fortuitously central to a sound
evaluation of the Schiavo Act, and essentially unexplored by
commentators. The issue is "undue process" in government decision making. We know that process can be too costly as a matter
of policy. Decision costs are just as real as error costs, and there
is a well-understood difference between maximizing process and
optimizing process But is excessive process, like inadequate
process, a constitutional problem? For all government institutions and for every threatened private interest? Are courts appropriate agents for policing undue-process violations? Despite
its impressive peculiarities, passage of the Schiavo Act is an appropriate occasion on which to ask these questions.
I. WHAT CONGRESS DEMANDED
The content of the Schiavo Act was, in many ways, trivial.
This fact hardly penetrated the intense public debate about the
proper outcome of the dispute-whether Schiavo, who had been
diagnosed as stranded in a persistent vegetative state for years,
should die quickly in accord with her husband's position; or
whether she should remain alive and attached to a feeding tube
in the hope of some improvement in her condition, as her parents requested. The Act's modest objective nonetheless affects
an evaluation of its lawfulness.
Congress offered no new claim on which Schiavo or her
parents could obtain a judicial remedy. The Act was perfectly
explicit on this point. It was to have no effect on substantive
law.6 Nor did the statute direct courts to reach a congressionally
4. See Michael P. Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo: A Primer on the American
ConstitutionalOrder?, 108 W. VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 8); Steven
G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law Enactedby Congress
and PresidentBush, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 151,153 (2006).

5. See infra text accompanying notes 54-59.
6.

See § 5, 119 Stat. 15 ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create substan-

tive rights not otherwise secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States or of
the several States."); see also id. § 1 (conferring subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims alleging that Schiavo's rights had been violated "under the Constitution and laws
of the United States"). Other sections of the Act prohibited interpretations that would
confer additional jurisdiction to consider assisted suicide cases, see id. § 6, disclaimed

precedential status for future legislation (for whatever practical value that might have),
see id. § 7, held harmless rights under the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, see id.
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favored result under existing law. Judges were no less and no
more free after the Act to identify, interpret, and apply substantive federal law. The Act did grant a federal district court jurisdiction to "hear, determine, and render judgment" on a set of
federal claims by or on behalf of Schiavo.' But in isolation, this
jurisdictional grant was superfluous. The U.S. Code already conferred Feneral federal question jurisdiction on the federal district
courts. And while the Act sternly announced that the district
court "shall issue such declaratory and injunctive relief as may
be necessary to protect the [relevant] rights of Theresa Marie
Schiavo," this command applied only "[affter a determination of
the merits"' and it added little if anyt..
to the court's preexisting remedial powers and obligations!. So the Schiavo Act
had nothing important to say about original jurisdiction, substantive law, or judicial remedies.
The objective of the statute was to facilitate the parents'
ability to obtain a judgment on the merits of their federal claims
in a federal court. Those lacking experience with the backwaters
of federal courts doctrine might be puzzled that another Act of
Congress could be necessary to achieve that end. Over the years,
however, the federal judiciary has devised a range of tools for
avoiding the merits of a claim. Some of these tools might be
traced to statutory text; others cannot be. In any event, reluctance to adjudicate can be found in cases involving controversial
constitutional questions,1 previously litigated issues,12 and past
or pending state judicial proceedings." The Schiavo controversy
fit all three categories. There had been extensive prior litigation. 4 Those battles culminated in a state court order directing

§ 8, and declared a "Sense of Congress" that it "should consider" policies for a broader
class of incapacitated people, id. § 9.
7. 1&. § 1 (addressing federal claims "relating to the withholding or withdrawal of
food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain [Schiavo's] life").
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000); see also id. § 1343(a)(3)-(4).
9. § 3, 119 Stat. 15 (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (authorizing declaratory judgments); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (discussing equitable
remedies). But cf.42 U.S.C. § 1983 (limiting injunctive relief against judges).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 478

(1995).
12. See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 695-733 (4th ed. 2005).
13. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION chs. 12-14 (4th
ed. 2003).
14. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
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removal of the feeding tube,15 and the U.S. Supreme Court had
just refused to stay the judgment. 6 Moreover, Schiavo's parents
were surely going to assert federal constitutional claims to keep
her alive, arguments that were the subject of media focus and interest-group action." Without the Act, Schiavo's parents faced
numerous objections with exotic-sounding labels like the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Anti-Injunction Act, abstention,
preclusion, prudential standing principles, and expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations.
The Act was written to clear away those sorts of hurdles to a
judgment on the merits. " The gist of the legislative effort is in
the following sentence:
In such a suit, the District Court shall determine de novo any
claim of a violation of any [federal] right of Theresa Marie
Schiavo ... , notwithstanding any prior State court determination and regardless of whether such a claim has previously
been raised, considered, or decided in State court proceedings. 9

Congress granted Schiavo's parents no more than a referral to
federal court for more process.
II. WHAT THE COURTS DELIVERED
Yet the Act made little difference. The courts quickly identified a rationale for dismissing the parents' suit without an extended examination of the merits, without contradicting the text
of the Act, and without declaring the Act invalid. The mechanism was denial of interim relief necessary to keep Schiavo, and
the controversy, alive?
15. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003, 2005 WL 459634, at *2
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 25,2005).

16. See Schindler v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1622, 1622 (2005).
17. See, e.g., Vickie Chachere, Schiavo's Parents Appeal Judge's Ruling, AP, Mar.
22,2005.

18. See § 1, 119 Stat. 15 (conferring subject-matter jurisdiction over certain federal
claims in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, thus averting
a Rooker-Feldman problem); id. § 2 (purporting to grant standing to "[amny parent of"
Schiavo, to identify proper defendants, and to direct the district court to adjudicate a suit
under the Act regardless of prior consideration in state court, abstention in favor of state
judicial proceedings, or exhaustion of state judicial remedies); id. § 4 (authorizing suit

within 30 days of enactment and regardless of any other time limitation).
19.
20.

Id § 2.
See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225, 1229 (11th Cir.

2005) (affirming the denial of the parents' request for a temporary restraining order to
move Schiavo to a hospital and reinsert the feeding tube, based on a poor likelihood of
success on the merits).

HeinOnline -- 22 Const. Comment. 508 2005

2005]

UNDUE PROCESS

In retrospect, judicial resistance can be accounted forespecially for those who see federal courts as a collection of political actors operating with special uniforms but without special
constraints on personal preferences. The dispute was controversial to put it mildly, and it appeared that the general public reacted unfavorably to Washington's intervention. Although the
purpose of the Act could have been constructed in a manner
conducive to interim relief, the plain text spoke to several other
procedural hurdles without mentioning that one.2' Moreover, the
parents' federal claims seemed weak. The statutes they cited
looked unhelpful; 2 their procedural due process claim ran up
against seven years of litigation; and their substantive due process count was novel. There was little or no precedent for a standalone federal constitutional right to receive food or medical
treatment. In any event, federal courts have a (part-time) tradition of hesitation in controversial cases.f Congress must legislate
against this backdrop.
At the same time, there was something bold about mootingby-death a national controversy, particularly one that Congress
wanted litigated to some extent. Congress should have considerable control over federal jurisdiction. Lower federal courts
were not mandated by the text of the Constitution; they were authorized at the option of Congress. The federal judiciary itself
relies on statutory grants to justify its authority to adjudicate,
and federal courts will ordinarily accept legislative adjustments
to jurisdiction. Some subservience to legislative wishes makes
good sense in democracies with unelected judges, especially if
those judges exercise constitutional judicial review. Political control over jurisdiction has its dangers, but it can reduce tension
between judicial independence and government accountability
to popular will. A system in which courts both control their own
21.

The Act was silent on the district court's authority or duty to provide relief be-

fore reaching the merits. Prior proposals were not. See S. 653, § 5, 109th Cong., 1st Sess.
(passed the Senate Mar. 17, 2005) (stating that the district court "may issue a stay" of any
relevant state court order); see also Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1227-28 (reprinting a Senate colloquy).
22. See Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1387-88 (M.D.
Fla. 2005) (rejecting claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act); Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1164-66 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
(rejecting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act).
23. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam), with Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), and
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 69-71,112-13 (1962).
24. Stays of execution are routine where necessary to reach the merits of a first federal habeas application. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314,320 (1996).
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jurisdiction and claim final authority on matters of fundamental
law might not be stable and it might not be normatively defensible.
III. UNDUE PROCESS?
Was court resistance justified by something more than selfish institutional prerogative? Was the Schiavo Act merely controversial or also unconstitutional? These questions turn out to
be difficult. But the constitutional issues involved are connected
to a big question about excessive process in constitutional law.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS

The most plausible constitutional challenge to the Act depends on three interrelated arguments under one general idea.
The general notion is about institutional roles-in short, that
Congress behaved more like a court of appeals than a legislature. The Act did not "adjudicate" the Schiavo case in a strict
sense. But Congress did single out one private dispute for additional review in a lower federal tribunal. Three specific arguments fill out this criticism, charging Congress with (1) furnishing special rules of decision for a particular case, (2) while
burdening Schiavo's freedom to refuse medical care, and (3) reopening the final judgment of a state court after years of litigation.
1. Singling Out
When a legislature singles out one case, especially a case
pending in court, it begins to take on the function of adjudicator.
In crude terms, legislatures are designed to create prospective
and generally applicable law which is interpreted and applied to
specific cases by courts. Distinct roles track distinct institutional
features, with legislatures composed of representatives accountable to popular (or at least external) will, while courts are somewhat insulated from ordinary politics and built to resolve discrete disputes.
These themes are reflected in case law. For instance, federal
courts will defend their freedom to interpret and apply existing
law in particular cases.2 As well, Article I, Section 9's bill of at25. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-48 (1871). For helpful
analysis of Klein's ambiguities and limits, see DAVID P. CURRIE, TiE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS,

1789-1888, at 308-11 (1985)
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tainder clause has been used to condemn legislative punishment
of specified persons. 6 And the Supreme Court recently confirmed that singling out one person for unfavorable treatment
may violate the equal protection clause.' It is at least possible,
then, that the Act should have been judicially nullified. Congress
intervened in one dispute, legislated new judicial proceedings for
three potential plaintiffs and associated defendants, and constrained the shape of the controversy by eliminating defenses
and requiring de novo review regardless of prior proceedings.
Schiavo's death ended the practical life of the Act.
But generalized separation-of-powers arguments are weakened here, and not only because they have difficulty producing
uncontested conclusions in most cases. The United States Government does not have and probably never has had pure institutional forms. Courts generate doctrine to elaborate other positive law, for example, and Congress has enacted private bills
from its very beginning. The first private bill was signed by
George Washington, and the tradition of personalized redress in
immigration and government-claims cases is still alive.2 The bar
on bills of attainder is limited to punitive legislative measures."
It is no threat to conventional private bills.' And a prohibition
more obviously applicable to the Schiavo Act-a restriction on

(pointing out that legislation commonly prescribes rules of decision for the judiciary),

and

MARTIN

H. REDISH,

FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF

JUDICIAL POWER 48-49 (2d ed. 1990) (suggesting that the case limits Congress's authority to direct federal courts to apply an independently unconstitutional rule). The subtleties were missing from Judge Birch's concurring opinion on denial of rehearing en banc,
which raged against Congress dictating to the courts any "rule of decision" or "standard
of review." Thankfully the argument retreated from that broad proposition and turned to
the Act's single-case scope. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 127475 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2005).
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 3; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,305,
311-18 (1946) (rejecting a legislative attempt to stop paying salaries to three government
employees after a House subcommittee found that they had engaged in "subversive activities").
27. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (per curiam)
(focusing on allegations of intentionally different treatment plus irrationality and arbitrariness in a dispute involving a couple's attempt to get connected to the municipal water supply).
28. See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of Richard W. Schaffert, H.R. 1023, 106th Cong.,
2d Sess. (passed as amended by the Senate Dec. 14,2000); 3 DONALD C. BACON, ROGER
H. DAVIDSON & MORTON KELLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS 1626-27 (1995); Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1684,
1693-1701 (1966).
29. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,472 (1977) (refusing to
condemn legislation "merely because [it] imposes burdensome consequences").
30. See Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370,380 (1940).
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"special legislation" included in some state constitutions31-is
absent from the federal document. In addition, the Supreme
Court has held that a statutory "class of one" will not always violate the Constitution.2 Congress's selective treatment of the
Schiavo controversy cannot, standing alone, establish the Act's
invalidity. The Act might have been a permissibly narrow and
remedial intervention in a hard-luck case, consistent with part of
the private bill tradition, and despite the husband's opposition to
more process."
2. Burdening Liberty
Criticism of the Act can be strengthened if an individual liberty interest was jeopardized, which might distinguish much of
the history of private bills. The husband's position was that
Schiavo would not want to remain indefinitely attached to a
feeding tube while "living" in a persistent vegetative state. And
the Supreme Court has suggested that Fourteenth Amendment
liberty reaches a person's choice to refuse artificially delivered
nutrition and water.4 One might worry that the Act unconstitutionally burdened Schiavo's liberty to refuse treatment by adding
a new avenue for judicial assessment of her situation, at the behest of those who were obviously opposed to the discontinuation
of care. Although concern for "right-to-die" choices does not
depend on Congress targeting one case, a one-case-only burden
might be even more difficult to defend.
But describing this criticism destroys its force. The argument turns on Schiavo's preferences before her injury (or her
simulated post-injury preferences), which involves a factual allegation that her parents rejected. At the very least, they believed
their daughter was more mentally functional than others supposed and that she would want (or actually did want) to continue
living. To be sure, the Florida state courts disagreed. A trial
31. See, e.g., ILL. CONsT. art. 4, § 13; MINN. CONST. art. 12, § 1.
32. See, e.g., Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472; Maine Central R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employees, 813 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825
(1987); accord Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468 (1982)
(distinguishing the bankruptcy clause's uniformity requirement); see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4 & art. IV, § 1.
33. Cf. Paramino Lumber, 309 U.S. at 375-78 (permitting a special legislative extension of time to challenge a refusal to award compensation from an employer to an

employee).
34. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990); see also
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003) (discussing prisoners' interest in preventing
administration of antipsychotic drugs).
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court earlier found, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Schiavo would have preferred to die in these circumstances.35
Relying on prior judicial proceedings, however, presents a new
issue. Schiavo's personal liberty interest in deciding the course
and extent of her care was not jeopardized by legislation extending judicial process over federal claims, unless her opposition to
additional care was a given-and it was not.
Indeed, her parents ultimately claimed that Schiavo had a
constitutional right to continue artificial feeding.36 This claim was
premised on their belief that Schiavo would want (or, again, actually did want) continued care. Had that belief been factually
accurate, more process would have advanced rather than hindered the asserted liberty.3 The "procedural due process" claim
was equally secure. According to the parents, the state courts
provided inadequate or biased proceedings in reaching a conclusion about their daughter's wishes. We can safely assume that a
life or liberty interest was at stake in the state litigation, and deficient process can be a constitutional violation even if the state
reaches an accurate conclusion. 39 At least nominal damages
would then be available for the due process violation. True, substantial compensatory damages sound inappropriate insofar as
Schiavo lacked consciousness during the allegedly flawed proceedings. And it would have made little sense to nullify the state
court order if it represented the legally correct decision based on
accurate factual findings. But to repeat, the parents did not accept those findings and, thus far, we have not identified a constitutional barrier to their obstinacy.
3. Unsettling Judgments
If the above is correct, then the Act's constitutionality
probably rests on the significance of prior judicial proceedings.
35. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, at 9 (Fla. Cir, Ct. Feb.
11,2000).
36. See Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (M.D. Fla.
2005) ("Plaintiffs allege that 'depriving [Schiavo] of nutrition and hydration contrary to
her wish to live is a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to life."'). The parents
also raised Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims. See id
37. This seems true for the parents' free exercise of religion claim as well as their
substantive due process claim. See Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1167-68; Schiavo ex reL
Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1387-88 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
38. See Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 1384-87; see also Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d at
1166-67 (describing the parents' argument that decisions to stop hydration and nutrition
require clear and convincing evidence that the incapacitated person would have made

that decision).
39.

See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,266 (1978).
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Precisely targeted legislation is not necessarily invalid; and identifying an intolerable burden on Schiavo's liberty depends on acceptance of state court conclusions about her preferences. Without determining the significance of past process, no federal court
could know whether Schiavo's (imputed) choice was being subjected to outrageously atypical procedural burdens-or instead
safeguarded by thankfully extraordinary legislative concern. But
if state judicial conclusions deserve respect, then the Act is in
trouble. Congress would be telling the husband, "Double or
nothing," without the "double."
Constitutional text does not answer this objection but case
law provides some support. The full faith and credit clause in Article IV dictates respect for State A's judgments in State B's
courts, while saying nothing about federal courts and providing
Congress authority over the effect of a prior state proceeding.
Still, the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of finality in
court judgments, if the proposed basis for reopening was not established beforehand. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.4 is the key
case. It invalidated a federal statute insofar as it required federal
courts to reopen final federal judgments in civil lawsuits. Concluding that the statute violated separation-of-powers principles,
the majority opinion emphasized the judicial function of actually
deciding cases, along with founding era examples of state legislatures granting new trials or otherwise interfering with the adjudication of particular cases. The Schiavo Act was similar.
Yet Plaut's holding does not settle the matter. First of all,
the Schiavo controversy involved state rather than federal court
judgments. The Plaut opinion reserved due-process-based arguments as a way of limiting its holding, and its rule might stop
short of insulating state judgments from federal statutes.43 The
opinion also distinguished judgments of territorial courts and
administrative agencies," which might suggest a category of non-

40. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
41. See id. at 218-19, 221-23.
42. Justice Breyer would have limited Plant's holding to legislation targeting a small
class of cases. See id. at 240-41 (concurring opinion); accord INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
966-67 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). Such targeting, which Justice Breyer used to more
tightly analogize the federal statute to the typical judicial function, is obviously present in
the Schiavo Act, and not necessary for a constitutional violation in the eyes of the Plaa
majority.
43. To be precise, the Court said it wished to avoid calling into question state legislation, see Plaua, 514 U.S. at 226-27, 234, which indicates even less about state court judgments.

44. See id. at 232.
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Article III tribunals deserving less constitutional respect. 4 Furthermore, a New Deal era decision upheld federal price control
legislation that prevented eviction pursuant to state court judgments.6
It might be hard to believe that Plaut would have come out
the other way had the litigation been concluded in a state court.
Federalism arguments aside, an originalist might recall that Congress need not have established lower federal courts at all, and
then wonder why it ought to have greater authority to reopen
state court judgments in a hypothetical system dependant on
their trial-level jurisdiction. If such reopening was forbidden in
1789, in line with common criticism of state legislatures acting as
appellate tribunals, then a contrary result seems difficult to support with subsequent developments. State courts might be more
likely to err when adjudicating federal claims than are federal
courts; but that assertion is contested' and hardly accepted in
contemporary Supreme Court decisions. 4
A state/federal distinction is not the only potentially relevant boundary, however. Outstanding injunctions have been
treated differently from judgments in damages actions. In Miller
v. French,49 the Court distinguished Plaut while evaluating a federal statute that required reconsideration of prison-reform injunctions.! The state trial court's order in the Schiavo case could
be treated similarly. At the same time, Miller might distinguish
itself. The opinion relies on a congressional decision to change
the underlying rule of decision. 2 But the Schiavo Act emphatically does not alter the law under which the parents' claims
would have been assessed. Substantive law was untouched. We

45. Cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (upholding appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928-29
(1997) (cabining the federal government's authority to direct the actions of state officers,
but distinguishing state courts); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992)

(same).
46.

See Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 102, 106-07 (1947) (rejecting a vested

rights argument assertedly grounded in due process, but focusing on retroactivity).
47.

See MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES,

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 271-75 (5th ed. 2002) (surveying the parity debate).
48. See, e.g., Tafffin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
49.
50.
51.
52.
stantive
prefers.

530 U.S. 327 (2000).
See id. at 342-45.
See supra note 2.
See Miller, 530 U.S. at 342. The idea seems to be that if Congress changes sublaw, it is not directing courts to interpret and apply existing law as the legislature
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can therefore surmise, but cannot know, how the Supreme Court
would judge the Act.
Narrowly stated and with attention to precedent, the constitutional issue devolves into something like this: whether Congress has authority to require federal courts to adjudicate federal
claims without regard to a prior state court judgment awarding
injunctive relief, where the federal statute does not alter the substantive rules of decision (although it does eliminate certain defenses) and where one controversy is selected for special treatment. But however narrow the question, the best answer is
intertwined with the broader problem of excessive process in
government decision making.
B. EXCESSIVE PROCESS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
As a matter of public policy, there is no question that a decision-making process can be excessive. For my purposes, "excessive" simply means too costly on net for private parties, the
state, or both. And by "process" I mean conduct that is both
(1) authorized by law, including that which may be demanded by
private parties, and (2) for the purpose of reaching any government decision.' Opposition to excessive process is shared by
everyone from Ronald Dworkin to Richard Posner to Charles
Dickens.5 In the same spirit, Mathews v. Eldridge6 famously
53. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendants compulsory
process to obtain witnesses).
54. Cf Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1877) ("A [patentable] process is
a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result."). This definition is
not tied down by the substance/procedure distinction at stake in the Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b). Examples of "process" include notice requirements, hearings,
methods of information collection, decision-maker deliberation, written explanations,
and appeals. But for now, it seems best to simplify the analysis by excluding some aspects
of "process" most-broadly defined, such as mechanisms for financing decision-making
and/or deterring its use-including filing fees and campaign contributions. The same can
be said for substantive law governing elements of a claim or defense. Decision costs are
affected by selecting rules as opposed to standards (in the law-and-economics sense, see
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. 557, 561
(1992)), but I make no claim about whether the Federal Constitution favors one or the
other.
Finally, I express no firm opinion on the degree to which some controversies should
not be "decided" with any real finality. (Perhaps much legislative business falls into this
category.) I will assume that a meaningful decision can be specified and is desired by all
interested parties.
55. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 13-14 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1996)
[18531 (discussing the everlasting suit of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce); RONALD DwORKIN, A
MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 77-78, 84, 92 (1985) (denying rights to the most accurate possible
procedures); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 21 (6th ed. 2003).
56. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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recognized the costs of added process as an "interest" that helps
cabin constitutional demands for more process. 7
It should be easy to see why caps on decision costs are attractive. Whatever praiseworthy objectives a process might
achieve-accurate information about existing law and historical
fact, just application of law to individual cases, creation of socially beneficial new law, moral legitimacy and peaceful acceptance of government decisions58 -those benefits come at a price.
Losses from process are counted not only in time or dollars, but
also opportunity costs of all kinds plus the burdens of extended
uncertainty, delay, and conflict. These costs are widely suffered:
by decision-makers, by other participants in the process, and by
society. 9 Our support for extensive decision-making protocols
should then vary with circumstances, including the costs of erroneous judgment.
We certainly will disagree about when the costs become excessive. But anybody should be able to cite examples of decisionmaking so protracted or onerous that their tolerance for squabbling or hand wringing runs out. Consider the multi-forum,
multi-decade fi0ht over nuclear waste storage at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. Or the most oppressive discovery demands of
the most aggressive litigators.61 Or the filibuster of judicial nominees-and perhaps the accompanying debate on the desirability
and constitutionality of the filibuster. 2 Or those lawsuits, agency
rulemaking procedures, immigration proceedings,63 and even
57. Id. at 335 (listing "the Government's interest, including ... the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail").
58. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JuSTICE 66-83 (1988) (connecting perceptions of procedural "fairness" to
satisfaction and compliance with outcomes); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors
in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Crl-. L. REV. 28 (1976) (adding individual dignity
and equality as procedural values); Robert E. Scott, ConstitutionalRegulation of Provisional Remedies: The Cost of ProceduralDue Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807, 810 (1975)

(concentrating on accuracy in adjudication); Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78
S. CAL. L. REv. 181 (2004) (emphasizing participation to foster "legitimacy"); cf

DwoRKIN, supra note 55, at 72-73, 102-03 (struggling to identify moral harm from inadequate process).
59. See generally POSNER, supra note 55, at 563; Scott, supra note 58, at 810.
60. See Nuclear Energy Inst. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1257-62, 1268-73 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (per curiam) (rejecting the agency's 10,000 year compliance period and remanding).
61. Cf. In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 330, 333, 349
(N.D. Cal. 1985) (refusing to compel immediate answers to about 1,000 interrogatories).
62. But cf. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster,21 CONST.
COMMENT. 445,446 & n.4 (2004) (noting little past treatment by legal scholars).
63. See Gaur v. Gonzalez, 124 Fed. Appx. 738. 743 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the
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presidential elections that seem to drag on endlessly. Some questions are not worth considering for very long, and perhaps no
question deserves to be considered for a lifetime.
The constitutional question is not the same as the policy
question, however. The issue we are interested in is whether federal constitutional law does or ought to contain a judicially enforceable norm against "undue process." Even if we could settle
on a norm, practical questions of implementation must be resolved. 4 Federal courts might not be the ideal institution for enforcing the ideal norm. It might be best if their judgment on at
least certain aspects of the matter were either irrelevant or respectful of assessments made by others. In this space I cannot
provide all of the consideration that these issues deserve, but I
can offer a foundation for future work.
1. ProcessFloorsand Ceilings in CurrentLaw
If forced to characterize the provisions of the U.S. Constitution as generally imposing either floors or ceilings on process,
the choice seems easy. Our constitutional text is bursting with
procedure. Obvious examples are the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as conventionally understood.' These clauses safeguard a wide range of private losses
and are not expressly limited to particular government actors.66
Other commonly invoked provisions speak to process associated
with courts, especially on the criminal side. The Fifth Amendment requires indictment by grand jury in certain cases. The
Sixth Amendment imposes on government a duty to inform the
criminally accused of the nature of the accusation, guarantees
confrontation of adverse witnesses and compulsory process for
obtaining other witnesses, and ensures access to counsel. Article
III, Section 2, establishes a right to demand trial by jury in ceragency initiated proceedings 16 years ago and took 9 years to decide the immigrant's appeal).
64. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: OIOOSING INSTITUTlONS
IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN
PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL PRACtiCE 6 (2004); David A.
Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 190, 208 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretationand Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886

(2003).
65. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972).
66. Courts tend to balk at supplementing rulemaking processes, however. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,445 (1915).
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tain criminal proceedings, and the Seventh Amendment does
likewise for civil trials. 7
Process floors are imposed in circumstances beyond adjudication, too. Aside from the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements, consider the processes for generating positive law.
The institutions and procedures involved in legislation and constitutional amendment are almost comically demanding, with bicameralism only the first headache for proponents of change.
Madisonian republicanism was intended, in part, to make a virtue of gridlock. Granted, these machinations are not endless. We
have two rather than three houses of Congress to approve legislation, and little chance that a third house is permissible without
a formal constitutional amendment.' It is nevertheless difficult
to extract from the text an overarching commitment to procedural parsimony.
Accordingly, process ceilings are less apparent. The Federal
Constitution lacks an explicit, general commitment to limiting
the burdens of government decision making.69 A careful search
exposes only a few places where the document indicates that decisions will be swift or final or otherwise capped as to burden.
Criminal defendants-who enjoy guarantees of both minimum
and maximum procedure that may increase government lossesare immunized from double jeopardy, cannot be forced to testify
against themselves, and must receive a speedy trial under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Jury findings of fact may not be
re-examined under the Seventh Amendment. And states are obligated to give full faith and credit to each other's judicial proceedings. 70 But that's about it. No simple, unified, anti-process
principle emerges from these provisions. They mix skepticism of
big government with respect for community judgment and a
general rule for resolving certain inter-state conflicts.
At this date, judicial precedent adds little to the notion of
undue process. Courts rarely address complaints from private
parties that government has imposed unconstitutionally exces67. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery except as a postconviction penalty).
68. Contrast the congressional committee structure and (perhaps) filibusters ended
only by supermajority vote. See id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (stating that "[elach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings").
69. Cf. GA. CONST. art. VI, § IX, para. I (the judiciary must provide "speedy, efficient, and inexpensive resolution of disputes and prosecutions"); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12
(guaranteeing prompt justice).
70. Congress may dictate the effect of such proceedings. See U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§1.
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sive process, and they have vindicated such concerns even less
frequently.71 There are just a handful of situations in which the
judiciary is likely to accept undue process objections.
Most significant, other constitutional values can be threatened by lots of process. One of these values condemns invidious
or arbitrary government action.72 Courts must see something better than animosity before they will legitimate burdens imposed
by the state. An excessive decision-making process could violate
this principle. The same goes for more specific constitutional
values. No court would permit a legislature to impose heightened evidentiary req rements on free exercise claims or AsianAmerican plaintiffs. ' Some actual free speech cases fit this
model, too. When government wants to review the content of

private expression before licensing its dissemination, courts impose administrative obligations to respond swiftly.74 Quick response times might actually increase the cost of a licensing
scheme, of course, but these court decisions are still sensitive to
the burden on private parties. Likewise in the equal protection

field. Courts have occasionally invalidated attempts by one segment of the population to elevate the procedural hurdles that
another segment must clear in order to make legal change, such
as by entrenching opposition to antidiscrimination laws in state
constitutions or city charters." In any event, the presence of ad71. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002) (denying that a temporary development moratorium, to formulate a land use
plan, was a per se taking); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (denying certiorari in a
case involving an inmate's claim that his long incarceration on death row would render
his execution cruel and unusual); Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 475-77 (2d Cir. 1989)
(rejecting an excessive process claim involving hearings in Medicare appeals); Angstman
v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 578, 917 P.2d 409, 412 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (same in the
zoning context); Mata v. Montoya, 91 N.M. 20, 21,569 P.2d 946, 947 (N.M. 1978) (rejecting what appears to be a non-constitutional objection in an employment dispute). But cf
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) ("At some point, a delay
in the post-termination hearing would become a constitutional violation."); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55,66 (1979) (condemning delayed hearing without reason in a government
employment dispute); Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 490 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that a nearly four-year delay in processing a disability-based benefits claim violated due process despite the agency's plea of inadequate resources); Sayles Hydro Assocs. v. Maughan, 985 F.2d 451,454-54 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a preemption claim
was ripe: "[t]he hardship is the process itself").
72. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
73. Setting aside the possibility that "strict scrutiny" might be satisfied.
74. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
75. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 631; Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F.
Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005) (striking down Nebraska's attempt to constitutionalize its
opposition to gay marriage, without finding a federal constitutional obligation to recognize it).
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ditional process is not doing much work here. Process is merely
one type of burden made troubling by the impact on independently valued conduct or parties.
A smattering of other precedent intimates special concern
for excessive process. No theme is immediately apparent in these
cases and their significance is limited. But there is one standout.
There is significant judicial sensitivity to delay-at least when
the decisions of other institutions are under challenge, the pri-

vate need seems acute, and the justification for inaction underwhelms the courts. Thus, in the context of discretionary government benefits claims, delay is a recognized constitutional
problem.7 6 Note also that land developers have had some success
using state constitutional law against municipalities trying to
slow the pace of change.7 Delay is obviously not a recently discovered element of decision costs. Impatience for government
responses to citizen complaints was present in the Magna Carta,8
and our courts sometimes declare that "justice delayed is justice
denied. ,7
Another example was discussed above: the rule against leg-

islation that retroactively reopens non-injunctive final federal
judgments. But the rule is narrow. Nothing about it prohibits
Congress from multiplying the grounds for reopening judgments
if the legislation applies only prospectively.' Due process cases
contribute little else. One aspect of the minimum-contacts test
76. See supra note 71 (collecting cases).
77. See Mitchell v. Kemp, 176 A.D.2d 859, 575 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 1991) (invoking arbitrariness against a land-use moratorium and a delayed zoning
ordinance).
78. See MAGNA CARTA
40 (1215) ("To no one will we... delay right or justice."), reprintedin SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 1, 17
(Richard L. Perry ed., 1959).
79. E.g., Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1363 (8th Cir. 1996) (Beam, J., concurring),
aff'd, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS
276 (1977) (attributed to William Gladstone). The concept of delay helps illuminate a
distinction between objections to excessive decision costs (broadly understood) and "too
much process." Delay can generate decision costs that fall on interested parties. But an
objection to delay will not necessarily isolate a feature of the decision-making process for
elimination. The objection could simply be that a hearing take place sooner rather than
later. Likewise, the best remedy for delay might not be "less process" but rather more
resources to handle the workload. I use terms like "excessive process" loosely. I mean to
capture the idea of decision costs, including the burden that results when government
decision-makers act at a leisurely pace.
80. The Plaut Court did suggest that the federal judiciary might be free to raise preclusion arguments sua sponte. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,232 & n.6
(1995). But even if this is a constitutionally protected prerogative, Congress may control
the effect of state judgments in other state courts and may legislate preclusion rules for
other contexts and for federal judgments. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
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for personal jurisdiction recognizes the burden imposed on defendants by an inconvenient forum.81 More tangentially, consider
state sovereign immunity. States may consent to suit by private
parties for damages, but otherwise they are usually immune.2
These rules have an anti-process character in that states may opt
out of litigation without escaping formal legal obligations. Yet
like minimum-contacts analysis, sovereign immunity doctrine
does not entirely shield states from process burdens. The issue is
how, not whether, legal duties will be enforced. Finally, the
canon for evaluating whether government has offered enough
process identifies a competing government interest in cost control." But this is an interest, not necessarily a constitutional concern. For that, we need to think generally about the virtues of an
excessive process norm.
2. Excessive Process in Theory
Little existing law supports any wide-ranging constitutional
norm against excessive process. Insufficient process is a far more
prevalent force. Is this normatively desirable? We can think
about this question from at least two perspectives: rights theory
and structural or institutional logic. Neither provides much support for a judicially enforceable undue process claim.
a. Fundamentalrights
If judicially enforced constitutional law should focus on a
set of fundamental human rights, it will be difficult to make
room for excessive process objections." This model sits on a contentious normative claim about the character of constitutional
law, whatever its descriptive power, and a rights theory can be
specified in many ways. But hopefully we can avoid taking posi81. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980);
Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of
PersonalJurisdiction,108 YALE L.J. 189, 233-34 (1998).

82. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,755-77 (1999) (noting consent and other limits); see also Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-29 (2003). Constitutionally inspired respect for the states might also help explain some court-fashioned
restrictions on habeas corpus. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). But these results might be too derivative-a criminal-justicerelated subset of a federalism subset of the general undue process problem. Moreover,

these cases have generated enough procedural rules of their own to forestall any snap
judgment that they reduce decision costs.
83. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
84. Cf DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 96 (remarking that "neither party has any right
against procedures more accurate than the accuracy required by" Dworkin's basic procedural right, which he defines in terms of consistency in weighting risks of moral harm

from substantive rights violations rather than a set level of accuracy).
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tions on those matters. Assuming any such rights theory applies,
undue process seems like a poor fit.
Recall that an undue process objection is founded on costs
associated with decision-making: money, time, other resources,
uncertainty. But these costs are ubiquitous and, partly for that
reason, ordinary. By contrast, due process claims might be more
easily and more often affiliated with human values typically denominated fundamental, like individual dignity and equal or personalized treatment. Providing a hearing in which a person or
her advocate may explain her position might be a dignitary interest of constitutional dimension." And even if it isn't, such participation rights can enhance accuracy in the adjudication of substantive rights. Preventing someone from enjoying such
participation, for the purpose of saving cash or avoiding hassle,
cannot reach the same order of importance in a fundamental
rights theory. This seems especially true insofar as costs are
shouldered by government officials and anonymous taxpayers.
Otherwise, every fundamental human right could develop an
anti-right pushing in the opposite direction and the very notion
of fundamentality loses meaning.
To be sure, a theory of rights need not-and cannot, in any
practical sense-encompass claims to maximum accuracy in the
adjudication of rights regardless of cost. But at least the motivation for enhanced decision-making procedures is tightly connected to arguably imperative concerns. 6 Not so for excessive
process concerns, or at least not necessarily so. We might imagine added process that also implicates concerns like dignity and
equal respect. Requiring only the poor to personally participate
in hearings involving their debts would not only impose ordinary
costs on that class; it might also carry an intolerable suggestion
of untrustworthiness. Yet this is simply a replay of the rationale
for derivative excess process claims: an independent commitment with a high (lexical) priority is threatened by more process,
yet only coincidentlyY The essential problem is humiliation, or
disregard, or some other value. Process is only a vehicle for the
injury. Even if the same doubts can be raised about rights to ample process-that such rights must piggyback on our dedication
85. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972) (referring to both fair play and
mistaken deprivations); id at n.22 (downgrading "rather ordinary costs" of process compared to a right to process before a "property" deprivation takes place); Mashaw, supra
note 58, at 49.
86. See generally DwoRIxN, supranote 55, at 76-78.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
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to other human values-this shared weakness cannot help the
argument for rights against excessive process.
Nothing seems to change if we concede that there is a right
to defeat unfounded claims of right.8 The concession indicates
additive rights to adequate process in the service of accuracy and
other procedural values. It need not produce rights in one party
to minimize the procedures demanded by another party.
b. Institutionalchoice and design
The cost-based objections propelling the idea of undue
process rest more easily within structural arguments and institutional theory. A primary task for such analysis is to choose and
design institutions that are most likely to achieve given objectives. Costs of all sorts may be considered. Now, some might
confine these arguments to pure policy and deny their relevance
to constitutional law. This is not a reason to stop now, though.
As with rights theories, so too for institutional theories: we need
not concede decisive power to any one of them. If they all suggest the same answer, we might reach a satisfying conclusion
without deeper commitments.
The critical question is what good would be done by judicially cognizable undue process claims. There is no doubt that
undesirable costs are associated with government decisionmaking, and that officials will sometimes err by adding too much
process. Indeed, high-cost decisional process might be a way for
officials to build turf.91 Let us assume, moreover, that excessive
process is a constitutional violation at least sometimes. The proposal at issue is more pointed, however. It contemplates judicial
intervention and, if conventional practices apply, judicial supremacy on the matter. Is this desirable?
A quick answer is not possible, in part because courts might
police any number of institutions in countless circumstances and
because there is no simple and consensus model of official be88. See generally DwoRKIN, supra note 55, at 96 ("When issues of substance are at
stake, the defendant's rights begin where the plaintiff's leave off.").
89. See, e.g., David L. Weimer, Institutional Design: An Overview, in
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1, 12 (David L. Weimer ed., 1995) (noting a dialogical strand as
well); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1280 (2001) (distinguishing institutional choice from institutional design).
90. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 249-50 (1999) (discussing incompletely theorized agreements).
91. But cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in ConstitutionalLaw,
118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005) (challenging assumptions that government tends to unjustifiably expand in any systematic way).
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havior.9 Progress nevertheless can be made with an important
doubt: it is far from clear that leaving the issue to ordinary law
and politics will result in serious and systematic errors.
Without undue process claims, the system would function
much the way it does now." Congress might legislate to add, subtract, or otherwise modify the decision-making procedures for
the executive branch and for the federal judiciary." Insofar as it
has not, the executive and the judiciary might draft their own
rules for their own purposes, as well as consider pleas for reform.95 If the system errs and manufactures excessive protocols
for decision, pressure for change may come from either officers
within each of those institutions or from interested outsiders.
And the mechanism for reform could be either internal (the executive or the judiciary altering their own process) or external
(legislation or even constitutional amendment).
Constitutional judicial review is an addition of questionable
value. The resulting anti-procedure norms would be judicially
approved if not wholly designed, and difficult to modify. Power
over process might be unjustifiably skewed toward court preferences, not only within the judiciary but elsewhere. We might
worry that officials will habitually over-economize on process to
save themselves the hassle; constitutional text suggests as much.
But that kind of distrust tends to distinguish due process from
undue process claims, and it does not confront the downside of
judicial review."
A court-centered approach is not all bad but it isn't a convincing improvement, either. Consider a few generalizations
about official behavior. One is that familiarity builds practical
92.

See, e.g., Nancy Maveety, The Study of JudicialBehavior and the Discipline of

PoliticalScience, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 1, 4-5, 33-35 (2003).

93. The analysis here brackets Congress's internal procedures as well as state practices.
94. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18 (granting Congress power "[tjo make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution... all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department... thereof").
95. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2000) (granting federal courts authority to "prescribe rules for the conduct of their business," if consistent with statutes); cf Department
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (recognizing inherent executive authority
to restrict access to sensitive information).
96. Nor is it apparent that pro-process interest groups will routinely dominate antiprocess interests. Certainly rule changes in civil procedure and habeas corpus include
important efforts to streamline decision-making. Cf Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (2000) (setting response times); Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(2000) (restricting district court injunctions if "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may
be had in the courts of such State").
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knowledge. Those who repeatedly perform similar tasks in similar settings have an advantage in evaluating the consequences of
one process over another. A second idea is that self-judgment
can threaten the public good. Like anyone else, government officials can be selfish and irresponsible or myopic and overconfident about their own ability to perform familiar duties. Outsiders might offer a more reliable assessment of work performed by
others. To a certain extent these two ideas present an unhappy
trade-off: competence for bias, dispassion for naivetd. Courts are
subject to these complications. They might be honest yet mistaken brokers, or interested yet expert players. These risks might
be at their apex when courts are asked to evaluate the net costs
of a decision-making method and where judges might enjoy important benefits from its absence.
Equally important are the alternatives to constitutional law.
Even if federal courts are reliable here-after all, they deal in
process constantly and their partial insulation from daily politics
can be advantageous-the objective might be achieved subconstitutionally. Formal amendments to statutes and rules are
not the only alternatives. Any marginally creative method of
statutory interpretation will provide opportunities to assess the
consequences of first-class process, not to mention the possibility
of common-law claims for abuse of process and the like.9' All of
this can be done without the judiciary freezing the results with
fundamental law.
Finally, an undue process claim needs limitations which are
not easy to see. Government decision-making always imposes
costs. And familiar procedures might be left in doubt as the judiciary works out the boundaries of excessive process objections.
Attractive targets include federal habeas corpus, the discovery
system for civil litigation, as well as an almost endless range of
administrative procedure. It would be a miracle if all of these
targets already operate with an optimal degree and form of
process. This is a lot to put up for grabs. 98
97.

At this time, the general rules for issue and claim preclusive effect of federal

judicial proceedings are entirely judge-made. See supra note 80. The abstention cases are
likewise largely the product of judicial imagination. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 13, chs. 12-14. Habeas corpus also has a long history of court-drafted barriers to

relief; some of them might reduce decision costs. See supra note 82.
98. Some of these arguments call into doubt existing due process doctrine. Although I will leave that issue to the reader, there could be meaningful differences between due and undue process claims. The most straightforward argument would be from
constitutional text. whatever else they mean, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are
widely read to impose process floors on government officials before (or after) they engi-
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Caveats are in order, however. Perhaps the judiciary need
not be either shoved all the way into or pulled all the way out of
undue process territory. Undue process claims might be softened
by requiring courts to see clear error, or defer to the moreinformed judgment of other institutions. Either could reduce the
threat of judicial mistakes. The breadth, not just the depth, of
these claims could be moderated as well. We might identify particular instances of government decision-making when we are
most confident that courts possess adequate competence along
with healthy detachment. Some forms of administrative adjudication are the most plausible examples. In those cases, the decision-making process would be less foreign to the judiciary, while
the institutional separation between agency and court presents a
reason to trust judicial opinion at least as much as the officials
responsible for the relevant process. On the other hand, excessive process seems less likely here-assuming that agencies cannot wholly externalize the costs of process for their own decisions.
In contrast, even moderated forms of undue process offer
no stirring support for judicial control over judicial process. Obviously courts are best informed about the operations of their
own institution. But they are also most likely to assume troubling parochial outlooks when someone complains that decisionmaking should be cut short. Process imposes costs on a large
class of people, making it easy for the judiciary to appear sympathetic while serving lower-minded interests in docket clearing. In
other words, courts might be habitually overexcited about undue
process claims made within their own house. An independent
judiciary can have clear advantages over other actors, but judging whether a case is too much work is probably not among
them. Combined with democratic skepticism about unbridled judicial review, there is good reason to locate this problem of excessive decision costs in the category of ordinary law.

neer life, liberty, and property deprivations. This does not necessitate assertive judicial
intervention, however, especially to run the decision-making processes of other institutions. Beyond text, one might try tradition, judicial precedent, the possible correlation
with "fundamental" or otherwise disproportionately prized human values noted above,
the possibly greater competence of courts in identifying abridgment of such values, and
the chance that government is more likely to unjustifiably economize on its own decisionmaking than mandate extravagant efforts to reach a resolution-though discounted by
the probability that courts will systematically underestimate the burdens of process in

non-judicial operations.
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CONCLUSION
The Schiavo Act was exceptional and for many reasons it
should stay that way. There probably were few actors less likely
to make a sound decision about the merits of the case than the
United States Congress. That said, the Act's modest objective
was not plainly unconstitutional and a provisional theory of "undue process" suggests that Congress acted within its authority.
The statute opened the federal courthouse for additional consideration of alleged rights violations, presenting the judiciary with
more work on a matter of life, death, or something in between.
Aversion to redundant litigation is a credible point in a policy
debate, it is often reflected in sub-constitutional rules, and it is
usually not a matter of fundamental law conjoined with judicial
supremacy. But correctly assessing the validity of this particular
statute is unimportant. What matters is rigorous and sustained
thinking about how to locate the ceilings-not just the floors-of
government process.
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